Thursday, 29 November 2007
Here's the handout:
Three Accounts of the Good Life
1. Objective list
--a. external list, e.g. God’s commands.
--b. flourishing: objective needs, interests, potential; successful cultivation of human and individual nature.
--a. actual desires
--b. improved desires: reflectively-endorsed desires; or desires I would have if I had full information and rationality; or desires I would have if I were fully developed.
--a.simple hedonism: happiness = pleasure (and the absence of pain); pleasure = single, simple mental state; good-makers = intensity, duration.
--b. complex hedonism: happiness = various, complex mental state; good-makers = intensity, duration, felt character, causal properties, authenticity… i.e. anything a competent judge would appeal to in discriminating between goods.
This recording cuts out just before the end (my dictaphone's battery went). All that's missing is me reading out the last couple of sentences of Groundwork:
And thus, while we do not comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, we do comprehend its incomprehensibility. This is all that can fairly be demanded of a philosophy that presses forward in its principles to the very frontier of human reason.
Thursday, 8 November 2007
Here's the mini-handout I refer to in the lecture:
Kant on sources of action:
1. Inclination (desire, aversion)
2. Imperatives (principles or maxims)
-a. Hypothetical imperatives (X is good for achieving Y)
--i. Problematic hypothetical imperatives (if you want Y, you should do X)
--ii. Assertoric hypothetical imperatives (because you want Y, you should do X)
-b. Categorical imperatives (X is unconditionally good, or is right/ obligatory/ morally required)